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Introduction 
On June 30th 2013, 19 members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew lost 
their lives in a wild fire outside of the town of Yarnell Hill, Arizona.  The fire fighters were 
entrapped after weather conditions rapidly changed fire behavior, and were forced to begin 
clearing dense brush and other fuels in order to make a deployment site for their emergency fire 
shelters.  The emergency fire shelter currently issued to wild land fire fighters, known as the 
M2002, is an excellent design to efficiently reflect radiant energy; however, the shelter is not 
able to withstand prolonged exposure to direct flame contact.  As a result, firefighters are trained 
to clear fuels away from the vicinity of their deployed shelter before flames encroach.  According 
to the official investigation report, the crew members had less than two minutes to use 
chainsaws, shovels, and other tools to remove fuels from the Yarnell Hill deployment site [1].  It 
is apparent that this was not enough time to complete the task; the hotshots had not yet finished 
clearing the site when the flame front overtook them and only some of the crew were found 
inside of a fully deployed fire shelter.  Temperatures of over 1100°C (2000˚F) were evident at 
the site; there were no survivors.  News of this tragedy spread around the country, and 
researchers at NASA Langley Research Center saw an opportunity to help prevent future 
tragedies like Yarnell Hill by utilizing their experience developing Flexible Thermal Protection 
Systems (FTPS) for inflatable decelerators to improve the shelter’s ability to withstand exposure 
to flames. 
For approximately the past 10 years, NASA Langley Research Center has been 
engaged in the development of FTPS for use on Hypersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic 
Decelerators (HIAD) for atmospheric entry [2, 3]. These inflatable decelerators could be 
exposed to peak, cold wall heat flux values up to 100 W/cm2.  The decelerator is constructed of 
an inflatable structure which is protected from heating by an outer FTPS covering.  The 
inflatable structure is composed of high strength polymer membranes, bands, and straps; 
therefore, this structure needs to be kept at a relatively low temperature in order to maintain its 
required mechanical strength.  Maintaining a temperature below material limits on the inflatable 
structure throughout the duration of entry is the purpose of the FTPS.   
As the name suggests, FTPS differs from traditional rigid heat shield thermal materials in 
that it must be flexible.  Inflatable decelerators are designed to be packaged and stowed into 
launch vehicles whose diameters are more than 5 times smaller than the diameter of the fully 
inflated structure.  As a result, FTPS materials must be able to be folded and compressed when 
packed without serious deleterious effect to thermal protection when deployed.  As with any 
flight article, packed mass and volume are primary constraints in the development of FTPS; to 
date, a typical inflatable heat shield FTPS concept is less than 25.4 mm (1 inch) thick with an 
areal mass of 3.1 kg/m2 (0.6 lb/ft2) to withstand a 10 kJ/cm2 integrated heat load Earth entry 
trajectory.  As a result, research into FTPS materials focuses on identifying candidates with high 
thermal efficiency, or, high thermal resistance with minimal mass and thickness.  Thermally 
efficient designs are realized both by utilizing high performance materials and also by applying 
these materials to specific heating regions within the internal FTPS layup where they are 
optimally suited to inhibit heat transfer. 
FTPS is composed of a stack of different thermal materials known as a “layup”.  The 
outer regions of the layup are exposed to higher temperatures than the inner regions of the 
FTPS which lie closer to the underlying inflatable support structure.  For this reason, materials in 
the outer region should inhibit heat transfer best at relatively higher temperatures compared with 
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the inner region.  The outer most layer in the FTPS layup is a refractory structural fabric 
intended to protect underlying insulations from shear flow forces and possesses optical 
properties favorable for rejecting radiant energy from the surface.  Heat transfer in high 
temperatures is dominated by radiant transmission; therefore, a preferred configuration is 
materials in the higher temperature region of the layup that are internally composed of radiant 
reflectors or opacifiers to reduce heat transmission toward the underlying structure.  Inner, 
cooler regions predominantly focus on the inhibition of gas conduction, which is the dominant 
heat transfer mode in this region.  The inner-most layer in the FTPS layup is the gas barrier.  
The gas barrier is designed to dead-head high temperature gas advection through the 
permeable insulation layers and protect the underlying structure from hot gas impingement.  
Traditionally, projects involved in research and development of FTPS for inflatable structures 
test material samples in an arc-jet tunnel and iteratively evaluate various candidate materials in 
order to converge on optimum material configurations that provide maximum thermal efficiency 
for a target trajectory. 
CHIEFS Initial Small Scale Sample Development 
In the fall of 2013, NASA Langley Research Center began an effort called Convective 
Heating Improvement for Emergency Fire Shelters (CHIEFS).  CHIEFS operated on the premise 
that lessons learned, test methodology, and technological advances realized over the past 
decade of NASA FTPS development could be applied directly to the fire shelter application due 
to several key similarities between atmospheric decelerators and fire shelters.  Both applications 
require durable flexible materials which can be packed to a minimal stowed volume, but be 
rapidly deployed for a single use to deliver predictable protection when exposed to a short 
duration and high intensity heat pulse. 
Despite the many similarities between FTPS technology for inflatable decelerators and 
fire shelter layups, several key differences were identified which made it necessary to focus the 
CHIEFS effort on developing a dedicated layup for the fire shelter application.  The forest fire 
environment is different from that of atmospheric re-entry partly due to the presence of oxygen 
at the Earth’s surface; several materials primarily composed of carbon – which exhibit desirable 
characteristics on decelerators where reduced oxygen levels are present – decompose 
exothermally upon heating in a fire shelter layup test.  Also, peak re-entry heating occurs at high 
altitudes with corresponding low static pressures; so, radiation is a more dominant mode of heat 
transfer in FTPS for decelerators.  Fire shelters would benefit from layups with more emphasis 
on addressing gas conduction.  Cost is an additional consideration for the fire shelter.  
Currently, the M2002 costs less than $400 per unit, and keeping the shelter within range of this 
price eliminates the use of many exotic materials which have been investigated for FTPS.  
There are additional considerations for the fire shelter due to the fact that it is occupied by a 
human being during use.  For example, it is not desirable to use materials with overly toxic or 
harmful decomposition byproducts, and such compounds should not be allowed to accumulate 
to considerable concentrations inside the shelter.  Finally, mass and volume constraints on the 
fire shelter are significantly different than on the inflatable decelerator.  The heating environment 
expected for the fire shelter is far lower.  Current FTPS candidates are tested to peak heating 
rates between about 5 and 10 times higher than average values reported in forest fire research; 
therefore, the M2002 wall thickness of less than 1 mm makes direct application of a nearly 25.4 
mm-thick FTPS layup inappropriate.  Additionally, crew in the field are required to carry up to 
18.1 kg (40 lb) of gear; and, according to a 2014 survey many firefighters already consider the 
1.95 kg (4.3 lb) M2002 too heavy [4].  Significantly increasing convective protection without 
noticeably increasing shelter mass or packed volume has proven a challenging proposition. 
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CHIEFS began in 2014 by conducting a series of small-scale laboratory convective tests 
at NASA Langley Research Center.  The small scale test setup, initially a duplicate of test 
equipment used by the USFS to conduct similar testing, will be discussed in subsequent 
sections, as well as in previously published reports [5, 6].  The primary focus of this initial testing 
was to rapidly screen various material options to assess the likelihood of developing a future 
layup with sufficient thermal efficiency to make a significant convective improvement to the 
M2002 layup without incurring significant increases in mass, volume, or cost.  By October 2014 
CHIEFS had screened over 100 unique material layups and demonstrated significant 
improvement to the convective performance of the M2002 layup.  At that time, the CHIEFS team 
met with USFS Missoula Technology and Development Center (MTDC) personnel and 
presented current research results at a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM).   
 MTDC had already been directed by the Washington Office Fire and Aviation 
Management (WO-FAM) to accelerate the lifecycle product review for the fire shelter and 
supporting components (a planned effort to assess materials available for a possible fire shelter 
revision).  This action was taken largely in response to the Yarnell Hill tragedy, and MTDC 
responded favorably to the exploratory results presented by CHIEFS.  In early 2015, NASA and 
the U.S. Forest Service entered into an Interagency Agreement and an open exchange of 
research findings and test collaboration ensued. 
First Generation (Gen 1) Full Scale Shelter Development 
After the TIM, CHIEFS resumed small-scale testing. With the intention of future full-scale 
shelter fabrication in mind, further improvements to the thermal efficiency of material layup 
candidates were investigated.  Additionally, considerations required to enable the practical 
construction of a full-scale shelter were investigated.  For example, materials not durable 
enough to be folded or sewn were discarded from the test matrix.  An approach was developed 
to provide options with a range of protection and document their associated mass and volume 
costs.   
With guidance from MTDC, the effort focused on the development of optimized light, 
medium, and heavy-weight layups.  The goal was to provide a shelter option that offered similar 
thermal protection to the M2002 but weighed less (light-weight), a shelter that weighed about 
the same as the M2002 but offered better protection (medium-weight), and an option that 
provided significantly better protection but was heavier (heavy-weight).  The heavy-weight 
option was likely to be too heavy to be carried by individual firefighters on foot, but may be 
considered as an option for equipment operators who are never far from vehicles where a 
shelter with significant protection could be stowed. 
In an effort to offset mass and packed volume, alternate shelter geometries were 
investigated.  By finding a design which provided acceptable occupancy and breathing air 
volume but reduced wall surface area, heavier layups could be used without incurring as much 
additional mass as would be evident if these layups were installed on the full scale M2002 
geometry.  Multiple options were investigated, and an initial design known as the “Thermal Pod” 
was decided upon as shown in Figure 1. 
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The Thermal Pod targeted the 
geometric efficiency of a sphere to achieve a 
design that uses about 20% less surface area 
than the M2002, and also decreased the 
surface area to volume ratio of the shelter, a 
configuration favorable to slower heating of 
the interior environment.  Shelters were also 
manufactured with the standard M2002 
geometry and NASA-selected materials.  A 
total of 12 shelters were manufactured:  three 
light-weight using the M2002 geometry, three 
medium-weight using the Thermal Pod 
geometry, and six heavy-weight shelters 
(three of the M2002 geometry and three of 
the thermal pod geometry).  These were 
CHIEFS’ first generation shelters. One of each of these shelters was exposed to controlled wild 
fire burns in Northwest Territories of Canada in June 2015, and the remaining shelters were 
subjected to full-scale laboratory tests at the University of Alberta in September of 2015.  The 
opportunity to participate in the Northwest Territories burns accelerated research efforts from 
small-scale laboratory tests to full scale shelter fabrication and testing in a period of about five 
months.  Full scale first generation shelter testing demonstrated encouraging thermal 
performance within the overall weight and volume regime; however, testing also revealed that 
future work was required to identify shelter seam designs that better prevent smoke and gasses 
from entering the shelter as well as to take into consideration the decomposition byproducts of 
shelter materials when heated and their associated toxicity and flammability levels. 
Second Generation (Gen 2) Full Scale Shelter Development 
Based on discussions with USFS in October 2015 it was decided to begin work on a 
second generation of NASA fire shelters, known as “Gen 2”.  The emphasis of the Gen 2 effort 
was on using materials with less volatile and toxic decomposition byproducts, seams with better 
sealing capability, as well as a continuation of the push toward higher technology readiness 
level, durable, and affordable materials. 
At present, a fire fighter can purchase an M2002 fire shelter ready for use for under 
$400; the CHIEFS team needed to keep this price point in mind when selecting materials in 
order to provide a practical shelter option.  An informal survey, administered by the USFS to fire 
fighters, indicated a preliminary reluctance to the design of the Thermal Pod concept.  Although 
this survey was not conducted across a wide group of firefighters, and responses seemed to 
indicate common misunderstandings in the questions asked, it was decided that emphasis 
would be placed on using the existing M2002 regular-length geometry with a potential for future 
investigations of slimmer-width or lower-height M2002 designs to reduce overall weight and 
packed volume if necessary.   
Some of the Gen 2 shelter development and testing is covered in previous writing by 
Fody, et. al. [5].  This reference includes descriptions of shelter layups, small-scale laboratory 
tests, and full scale tests conducted on ten shelters at North Carolina State University (NCSU) 
in early March 2016.  Test results from NCSU, including video taken inside the shelters during 
heating, indicated that significant heat and combustible gasses were entering the shelter 
through the wall seams prior to any significant degradation in the surrounding wall material.  On 
occasions internal flaming and/or combustion was observed after these gasses had 
 
FIGURE 1: CHIEFS GENERATION 1 GEOMETRY 
"THERMAL POD". 
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accumulated for some time.  Consequently, much of the testing conducted at NCSU focused on 
screening various shelter wall seam construction concepts in search of a design that was both 
relatively impermeable as well as practical to manufacture in full scale production.  Additional 
testing was conducted at NCSU during the summer of 2016, with top performing shelter 
candidates carried forward to testing at the University of Alberta with the USFS in September of 
that year.   
Nine unique full scale shelter candidates were tested at the University of Alberta in 
September 2016, also covered in previous writing by Fody, et. al. [6].  These shelters were 
variations of five unique wall material layups, four seam construction concepts, and two shelter 
geometries.  The shelter geometries tested were mostly the standard M2002 shape; however, a 
modified concept developed by NASA known as the “MW” shelter was also tested.  The MW 
design was approximately the same size and shape as the M2002; however, rather than the 
spherical end caps used by the M2002 (created by the use of three darts) a continuous seam 
ran down the length of the shelter at the centerline.  By producing this shelter with only one 
seam, using only two panels, the manufacturing was simplified and there was some reduction in 
shelter weight as well.  Another advantage of the MW concept was that the running seam length 
was reduced; seams were suspected to be a source of hot and combustible gasses entering the 
shelter.  The MW shelter concept can be seen in Figure 2. 
Shelter performance during the September 
2016 tests were generally good, exhibiting an 
average increase in shelter habitability of about 
60% compared to the M2002, and were used to 
drive key design decisions moving forward.  At this 
point, shelter habitability began to be defined by 
finding the earliest failure of several variables 
including but not limited to exceeding a maximum 
shelter interior carbon monoxide limit, minimum 
oxygen limit, and maximum breathing zone 
temperature.  The layup known as “PDS3” 
exhibited the best performance (average 
habitability time of 104 seconds compared with the 
M2002 at 56 seconds); this layup was 
consequently carried forward as the baseline for 
the close-out shelter concepts described in greater 
detail in the “Close-Out Shelter Layups” section of 
this paper.  The MW geometry showed a slight 
improvement in thermal performance when 
compared to an equivalent M2002 geometry 
shelter (about a 9% improvement in habitability 
time).  Contrary to test results at NCSU, the tests 
at the University of Alberta showed only minimal 
advantage of any of the more complicated seam 
construction designs tested compared with the 
standard M2002 wall seam.  The M2002 wall seam 
was the simplest construction to manufacture; as a 
result, the more exotic seam concepts were dropped moving forward and all shelters used the 
standard M2002 wall seam.  The most significant change to the CHIEFS concepts moving 
 
FIGURE 2: CHIEFS MW SHELTER GEOMETRY. 
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forward from the September 2016 tests was the loss of the baseline polytetrafluoroethelyne 
(PTFE) gas barrier laminate.   
The baseline gas barrier layer (inner most layer to the shelter interior of the shelter wall) 
for Gen 2 CHIEFS shelters was a fiberglass reinforced PFTE laminate.  This laminate is 
described in greater detail in previous work by Fody, et. al. [5].  The PTFE gas barrier provided 
significant improvement to the M2002 standard gas barrier due to its ability to remain 
impermeable up to wall temperatures approaching 500°C (932°F) (determined by measuring 
mass loss upon exposure to heating in a furnace) compared to the M2002 gas barrier which 
fully delaminates at temperatures less than 400°C (752°F) (determined by observing samples 
exposed to temperatures in an oven for two minutes).  Tests in September 2016 showed that 
there was a 24% increase in duration of habitability with CHIEFS shelters using the PTFE gas 
barrier compared with equivalent CHIEFS shelters using the standard M2002 gas barrier.  
However, the USFS eliminated the use of the PTFE gas barrier due to concerns about possible 
deleterious decomposition byproducts being released into the shelter interior upon heating.  
With this elimination, the CHIEFS effort had no readily available alternative apart from the 
M2002 gas barrier.  CHIEFS shelters using the M2002 gas barrier exhibited only a 28% 
improvement in habitability compared with the current M2002 shelter (compared with 86% in the 
best performer using PTFE); consequently, an effort to find a suitable replacement gas barrier 
commenced. 
PTFE Gas Barrier Replacement and Close-Out Full Scale Shelter Development 
Much of the 2017 fiscal year was spent investigating potential replacements for the 
PTFE gas barrier that exhibited improved performance relative to the M2002 gas barrier.  
Various novel methods of directly bonding aluminum to fiberglass fabric investigated included 
hot pressing, hot rolling, coating the fabric in molten aluminum, and creative ways to use 
ultrasonic welding to secure aluminum foils to the fiberglass.  Additionally, CHIEFS began 
screening various adhesives with high temperature tolerance relative to the adhesive used in 
the M2002 gas barrier.  Ultimately, the adhesive approach, not direct bonding, proved to be 
most commercial ready and a polyimide adhesive produced by Imi-Tech Corporation was 
procured.  Panels were laminated with the Imi-Tech adhesive at NASA Langley Research 
Center using the same fiberglass fabric and aluminum foil as the M2002 gas barrier; these 
panels were used to fabricate full scale shelters and included in testing at the University of 
Alberta in April 2017. 
Shelter performance during the April 2017 test was generally unimpressive with several 
shelters exhibiting similar durations of habitability as the M2002.  The baseline shelter concept, 
which used the “PDS3” layup with a standard M2002 gas barrier, was among the top performers 
exhibiting a habitability about 28% better than the M2002, consistent with a similar shelter 
tested in September 2016 using the same gas barrier.  The MW shelter tested exhibited about 
average thermal performance for the CHIEFS designs tested (12% improvement in habitability 
compared with the M2002).  Additionally, the USFS raised concern over the shelters tendency 
to collapse inward during heating and decrease the internal volume and consequently breathing 
air available.  As the MW shelter would need additional manufacturing development to be a 
practical design to carry forward, it was abandoned for future tests with the idea that it might be 
picked up again in the future. 
An inverted (foil facing outward toward the heat source) standard M2002 gas barrier 
exhibited surprisingly good post-test material conditions.  Large concentrations of combustible 
byproducts were injected into the shelter interior upon thermal failure of the standard M2002 
laminate adhesive which resulted in significant combustion early in the test; however, the 
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temperature plot of the shelter interior prior to the combustion showed promise.  The shelters 
with the Imi-Tech polyimide adhesive (installed in the normal foil inward configuration) 
performed relatively well thermally and the adhesive remained intact longer than the M2002 gas 
barriers tested in the same orientation.  It was also apparent that the polyimide adhesive 
decomposed into less combustible volatiles than the standard M2002; however, carbon 
monoxide levels were high.  In an effort to zero in on an enhanced gas barrier concept, an 
inverted M2002 laminate using the polyimide adhesive (inverted laminate) was carried forward 
to CHIEFS close-out shelter testing. 
This writing will now focus on tests conducted at the University of Alberta in August and 
September 2017, as well as small scale tests of samples of the same layups conducted at 
NASA Langley Research Center.  Shelters tested were variants of the successful “PDS3” layup 
carried forward from the September 2016 tests, which replaced the PTFE gas barrier with a 
novel concept which includes the inverted laminate described above.  At the conclusion of fiscal 
year 2017, CHIEFS failed to secure continued funding into fiscal year 2018 (the October tests 
had already been funded); therefore, these tests are now considered “close-out shelters” and 
are the final concepts produced by NASA’s CHIEFS effort.   
Small-Scale Convective Test Setup 
The CHIEFS small-scale test apparatus was the primary test setup used to perform 
testing on candidate material layups being considered for full scale shelter development.  The 
design is a modified version of the setup used by the U.S. Forest Service [7, 8, 9, 10, 11].  The 
CHIEFS small-scale setup is shown in Figure 3, and consists of a cylindrical copper cup that 
contains the test sample, attached to a 
water cooled copper plate, and a 
Meker burner.  The Meker burner is 
very similar to the Bunsen burner; 
however, its flame structure is an 
aggregate of small cones (rather than 
one large cone as in a Bunsen burner) 
and heating is distributed more evenly 
across the test sample surface.  When 
testing, the flame is first calibrated to a 
cold wall heat flux of 8  0.4 W/cm2 
using a copper disc calorimeter before 
test samples are exposed to heating.   
 
FIGURE 3: CHIEFS SMALL SCALE CONVECTIVE TEST SETUP. 
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The test sample which consists of an outer shell material, insulation layers, and an inner gas 
barrier is installed in the cylindrical cup.  The outer shell 
faces down toward the flame.  A 5.1 cm (2 inch) thick loose 
fill alumina fiber batting is placed on the backside of the gas 
barrier (above the sample) to produce a quasi-adiabatic 
backside boundary condition.  Two thermocouples are 
typically installed on the backside of the gas barrier and 
their average value used.   The sample is exposed to the 
calibrated flame, and the transient thermocouple response 
on the gas barrier is recorded and analyzed in order to 
make decisions about material selection and placement 
within the layups.  A post-test calibration is also performed 
in order to ensure that exposure heat flux did not deviate 
drastically from the initial calibration level during the test.  A 
schematic of the small scale test setup is shown in Figure 4. 
Full Scale Shelter Test Setup 
 The August and October 2017 full scale tests were conducted at the University of 
Alberta’s Protective Clothing and Equipment 
Research Facility (PCERF) satellite laboratory in 
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.  The facility is 
contracted by the USFS MDTC to conduct testing 
in support of their fire shelter revision.  All official 
test data on full scale candidate fire shelters, 
which may be selected to replace the M2002 by 
the USFS, was generated at this facility.  A 
photograph of the test setup is shown in Figure 5.  
The top photograph shows the instrumentation to 
be positioned inside of the shelter, shown on its 
side, once the shelter was placed flat on the test 
bed.  The bottom photograph shows the shelter in 
position for testing, and eight propane torches 
oriented around the perimeter of the shelter. 
The fire shelter is positioned on a flat-bed 
test stand built onto a mobile trailer so that it may 
be placed outdoors.  The bed of the test stand is 
covered in a continuous layer of approximately 
2.5 cm (1 inch) thick alumina fiber batting.  The 
propane torches located around the periphery of 
the bed, and the openings in the edges of the bed 
around the torches allowing the flames into the 
interior, are shown in the lower figure.  There are 
eight torches: one at the head, one at the foot, 
and three evenly spaced along both sides of the 
test bed.  A galvanized steel enclosure is placed 
 
FIGURE 5: FULL SCALE SHELTER TEST APPARATUS 
WITHOUT ENCLOSURE.  INSTRUMENTATION (TOP), 
AND DEPLOYED TEST ARTICLE (BOTTOM). 
FIGURE 4: SMALL SCALE CONVECTIVE 
TEST SETUP SCHEMATIC. 
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over the shelter prior to testing so that flames are confined close to the shelter wall.  A 
photograph of the test rig with enclosure installed and torches active is shown in Figure 6.  
A shelter frame was used for all close-out shelter tests.  The frame was constructed of 
approximately ¼-inch x ¼-inch steel bar bent into a basic structure and closely fit the inside of 
the shelter; however, the design was intended to prevent tight contact and compression of the 
shelter walls.  The frame was covered in strips of alumina batting to prevent direct contact of hot 
bare metal with the wall material.  The purpose of the frame was to keep the shelter propped up 
into a consistent full shape so as to ensure consistent internal volume and shelter wall 
dimensions between tests.  The framework was relatively thin and not expected to significantly 
impact thermal conditions inside the shelter.   
All CHIEFS shelters were constructed with a “racetrack” floor.  The racetrack floor was a 
6-inch band of floor material that ran around the outside of the shelter wall, lying flat on the test 
bed, rather than the conventional internal floor (a “racetrack” running around the inside, that the 
firefighter uses to hold the shelter down to the ground).  Standard M2002 shelters tested were 
manufactured with the standard internal floor; in these shelters the internal floor was cut radially 
on regular intervals so that the floor material could be folded outward to mimic the exterior 
racetrack design.  Strips of 1-inch thick alumina fiber batting were placed around the shelter 
perimeter, on top of the external floor material, and a heavy chain was placed around the 
periphery of the shelter floor band on top of the alumina batting.  The purpose of the chain and 
insulation was to keep the shelter tight against the test bed floor and prevent flame ingress into 
the shelter from underneath, and having the shelter floor on the exterior of the shelter allowed 
easy access for placement of the chain and alumina batting. By preventing flame ingress into 
the shelter from underneath, wall materials performance could be isolated and compared 
between shelters.  It was generally assumed that ground conditions at a given site in a real fire 
shelter deployment would be the driving factor influencing any flame ingress from underneath 
the floor bands, and terrain can vary wildly.  Such variations in terrain, fire behavior at the 
ground level, and the orientation and size of the firefighter inside the shelter holding the floor 
material down to the ground would contribute to variation in a real shelter deployment but would 
be impossible to account for in a repeatable laboratory test.  Additionally, without the use of the 
exterior racetrack floor, chains, and insulation, slight variations in the placement of the shelter in 
the laboratory test bed introduces confounding variability in the amount of flame ingress from 
under the floor band to the shelter interior making it difficult to isolate the effect of a candidate 
shelter’s material design on overall test performance. 
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Two thermocouple trees were mounted 
on the flat-bed test stand close to the location 
where the head of a firefighter would be 
positioned during an actual deployment 
(approximately 25.4 cm (12 inches) from the 
heated head end of the shelter), and in 
approximately the same location at the foot of 
the shelter. Two thermocouples were installed 
on this tree, at heights of 5.1 and 25.4 cm (2 
and 10 inches) above floor level.  The 5.1 cm 
(2 inch) thermocouple represents the 
temperature associated with the breathing 
zone of the fire fighter and was the most 
critical measurement during these tests.  
Limits of human survivability for breathing air 
are assumed by the Forest Service to be 
temperatures of approximately 150°C; so, the 
main evaluation criteria for shelter testing is to 
determine the elapsed time until the 5.1 cm (2 
inch) thermocouple exceeds 150˚C.  It should 
be noted that since the heating is 
approximately symmetric in the test bed, 2-
inch and 10-inch temperature data reported is 
an average of the “head” and “foot” 
thermocouples in the shelter. Shelters were 
tested until either the cooler of the two 2-inch 
thermocouples exceeded 150°C or 120 seconds of testing had elapsed (whichever occurred 
first).  Structural components on the test bed limit the shelter test duration to 120 seconds 
maximum; however, tests are usually terminated due to the two 2-inch thermocouples limit so 
tests typically do not reach 120 seconds in duration.  Close-out shelter tests often did reach the 
120 second mark – tests limited by hardware limits rather than shelter failure – but this 
phenomenon was rarely observed in any previous testing conducted by the USFS including 
previous NASA CHIEFS shelters. 
Copper disk calorimeters, the same type that was used in the small-scale convective test 
setup calibrations, were embedded into boxes on the shelter floor with the copper disk facing 
upward so as to measure an estimate of the total heat flux incident on the shelter floor. Two 
boxes were located in the test bed, one near each of the two thermocouple trees described 
above, and can also be seen in Figure 5.  The boxes had a flat horizontally level top, with 
angled sides facing approximately 45° from the top.  One calorimeter was placed in the center 
of each of the three surfaces of the box, one flat horizontal and two on 45° angled sides, in both 
boxes (total of six sensors).  The calorimeters were intended to primarily approximate the level 
of thermal radiation a firefighter would be subjected to inside of the shelter; however, some 
convective heating must also be contributing to the measurement.  The six sensors were 
averaged when internal heat flux is reported for the tests. 
Gas sampling ports were located in the test bed near the location of one of the copper 
calorimeter boxes near the shelter end.  Shelter interior gas composition was analyzed by two 
methods.  First, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide were analyzed using a California 
Analytical instrument which provided continuous data sampling from a constantly streaming 
 
FIGURE 6: FULL SCALE SHELTER TEST APPARATUS AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA WITH FLAMES ON DURING 
TESTS. 
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sample.  The sample for the first method traveled through a small diameter clear polymer tube 
spanning approximately 5.1 m (20 feet) between the instrument and the gas port; consequently, 
there was a lag of about 20 seconds between reported temperatures and reported gas 
composition from the first method.  The second method of gas composition analysis was used 
only occasionally.  Immediately after heating was terminated, a vacuum pump was activated 
which pulled a gas sample from one of the ports in the test enclosure into a grab bag located 
some 2.5 m (10 feet) away from the test enclosure.  The contents of this grab bag were 
intended to contain the mixture of decomposition byproducts produced by the various shelter 
materials during heating.  This grab bag was sent off to an independent laboratory where a 
capillary gas chromatograph-mass selective detector was used to compare spectral data to a 
library of known compounds for best guess identification of constituents.  This method has some 
limitations, not the least of which is that samples are obtained at the conclusion of the test after 
wall materials have been structurally compromised and the internal atmosphere may be able to 
ventilate freely to the external environment. As a result, the analysis does not give a good 
indication of the compounds that a firefighter may be exposed to in the event that an actual 
shelter deployment does not endure long enough to reach the point of failure (the point at which 
a firefighter would no longer survive, as determined by the thermal test termination criterion).  
This method does, however, provide some indication of potentially toxic compounds that may be 
produced by a tested shelter under certain conditions. 
The heat flux inside the enclosure was measured with two Medtherm Schmidt-Boelter 
type heat flux calorimeters (model 64-20T-20R(S)-21210).  The Medtherm sensors each had 
two non-cooled Schmidt-Boelter calorimeters, one positioned behind a sapphire window in order 
to measure the radiant portion of incident heat.  By subtracting the measured radiant portion of 
the heat flux from the total heat flux measured by the second calorimeter, the convective 
component could be estimated.  There is some concern about the accuracy of the radiant data 
due to the portion of the infrared spectrum in which the sapphire is transparent; thus, the total 
heat flux measurement was predominantly used.  The devices were placed inside the metal 
enclosure, one near the shelter head and one near the foot, and faced in toward the test article. 
Finally, one or two video cameras were placed inside of the fire shelter during testing.  
The cameras were placed in insulated boxes placed near the copper calorimeter heat flux 
boxes.  Each camera faced toward the opposite end of the shelter.  The video images provided 
useful visual data on the conditions inside the shelter including apparent smoke density, 
presence of flaming or flashing, points of smoke or flame ingress, and material conditions 
throughout the test such as charring, cracking, delamination, or sagging of wall materials. 
Close-out Shelter Layups 
The first generation, Gen 1, CHIEFS shelters were mainly designed to increase 
convective thermal performance with an emphasis on keeping mass as low as possible.  In 
addition to convective thermal performance and mass, Gen 2 efforts targeted shelter packed 
volume, cost, toxicity of 
decomposition byproducts, 
durability, and ease of 
manufacturing.  The 
shelters developed for the 
March 2016 test series 
used the standard M2002 
 
FIGURE 7: LAYUP OF CURRENT M2002 SHELTER. 
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geometry and targeted layups with areal masses not to exceed 15% of the areal mass of the 
M2002 shelter (less than or equal to 0.4 g/in2 (18.3 oz/yd2)).  As a result, many successful Gen 
1 materials were abandoned, and new materials were introduced.   
The existing M2002 shelter layup is shown in Figure 7.  The outer shell consists of a 
0.4064 mm (0.016 in) thick silica fabric at 0.208 g/in2 (9.5 oz/yd2 ) laminated by Custom 
Laminating Corp. (Mt. Bethel, PA) to a 0.0254 mm (0.001 in) thick aluminum foil using a 
proprietary water based adhesive.  The outer shell is installed on the shelter with the aluminum 
foil facing outward.  The inner layup consists of a 0.0508 mm (0.002 in) thick fiberglass fabric 
with an areal mass of 0.030 g/in2 (1.38 oz/yd2 ) laminated to a 0.0178 mm (0.0007 in) layer of 
aluminum foil using the same adhesive, also from Custom Laminating Corp.  The inner shell is 
installed on the M2002 such that the aluminum foil faces the shelter interior.  The overall 
thickness of the shelter wall is 0.5004 mm (0.0197 in) with an overall areal mass of 0.34 g/in2 
(15.5 oz/yd2).   The overall shelter with the floor band, seams, and straps weighs 1.95 kg (4.30 
Ib) and has a packed volume of approximately 3441 cm3 (210 in3).  The shelter is 218 cm (86 
inch) long, 39.4 cm (15.5 in) high, and 78.7 cm (31 in) wide when deployed.   A photograph of 
fully deployed M2002 shelter is shown in Figure 8. 
Various gas barrier materials were 
investigated by CHIEFS to see if lighter 
options, with improved thermal performance, 
and lower cost – relative to the first generation 
gas barriers – could be identified. The first 
and second generation shelter gas barrier 
was a PTFE-fiberglass fabric laminate with an 
areal mass of 0.085 g/in2 (3.89 oz/yd2 ).  After 
the completion of full scale shelter testing at 
the University of Alberta in September 2016, 
the USFS eliminated the use of the PTFE gas 
barrier due to concerns about possible 
deleterious decomposition byproducts being 
released into the shelter interior upon heating.   
A primary focus of the CHIEFS effort during the 2017 fiscal year was to identify a 
suitable replacement gas barrier to the baseline PTFE laminate; several concepts were 
investigated including a fiberglass-aluminum foil laminate fabricated using a high temperature 
polyimide adhesive and an inverted standard M2002 gas barrier.  Ultimately, a hybrid of these 
two concepts was carried forward: an inverted (foil facing outward toward the heat source) 
M2002 gas barrier which used the polyimide adhesive.  The inverted laminate was constructed 
of a fiberglass fabric and aluminum foil very similar to the existing M2002 inner liner except for 
the use of a high temperature polyimide adhesive.  The inverted laminate was installed in the 
fire shelter layup in reverse orientation to the current M2002 inner liner with the aluminum foil 
facing outward away from the shelter interior.  The inverted orientation demonstrated 
significantly improved thermal performance, likely due to three factors.  First, the higher failure 
temperature of the polyimide adhesive and, second, the inverted orientation of the laminate kept 
the aluminum foil intact and in place longer than the M2002 inner liner which typically exhibited 
large scale delamination with sections of the aluminum falling into the shelter immediately 
followed by a large spike in interior air temperature.  Keeping the aluminum intact and in place 
longer likely worked to minimize bulk gas advection through the highly permeable insulations in 
more outward layers of the shelter wall layup.  The third factor likely benefitting the inverted 
laminate is that placing the aluminum closer to the heat source, rather than closer to the shelter 
 
FIGURE 8: EXISTING FIRE SHELTER (M2002) [12]. 
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interior, took advantage of aluminum’s high radiant reflectivity and likely worked to protect the 
underlying adhesive and fiberglass fabric.  The major disadvantage of this inverted laminate 
was that upon failure of the polyimide adhesive, large amounts of visible smoke and measured 
carbon monoxide gas (as well as a variety of other constituents) were released directly into the 
shelter interior.  As a result, the inverted laminate was not deemed to be viable in its original 
form, but the addition of an aluminized polyimide film (aluminized Kapton) beneath (interior of) 
the inverted laminate (aluminized surface also facing outward toward the heat source) was 
proposed to mitigate the release of these undesirable byproducts and provide additional 
capacity to inhibit gas advection and reduce radiant heat transmission toward the shelter 
interior.  This binary gas barrier system was carried forward for testing in the currently described 
close-out shelter layups.  
The binary system consisted of the inverted laminate installed (aluminum facing 
outward) above (outward of) a layer of aluminized Kapton (aluminized surface facing outward).  
The inverted laminate was composed of a layer of 1235 series anodized aluminum foil 0.02 mm 
thick (.00079 inch), adhered to a layer of 1080 denier fiberglass fabric coated with a silane 
sizing at 0.0508 mm (0.002 in), using a proprietary polyimide adhesive supplied by Maverick 
Corporation.  Maverick Corporation performed the laminating work as well.  The areal mass of 
the laminate was 0.067 g/in2 (3.1 oz/yd2), and its thickness was 0.220 mm (0.009 inch).  
Additionally, a variation of this inverted layup was tested using a layer of 1100 series aluminum 
foil 0.018 mm thick (.0007 inch), adhered to a layer of 1080 denier fiberglass fabric at 0.0508 
mm (0.002 in), using a proprietary silicone based adhesive supplied by Custom Laminating 
Corporation.  Custom Laminating Corporation also performed the laminating work on this layup.  
The areal mass of the laminate was 0.070 g/in2 (3.2 oz/yd2), and its thickness was 0.085 mm 
(0.003 inch). This silicone adhesive laminate had been tested in the past by the USFS, and had 
been rejected due to a significant buildup of white powder on the shelter interior test bed, 
possibly colloidal silica, upon failure of the adhesive.  However, the silicone adhesive was 
desirable for three reasons: it was produced by a company which already has a good working 
relationship with the USFS, it is more durable and flexible at room temperature than the 
polyimide adhesive laminate from Maverick Corporation (in its current form), and it is likely a 
much cheaper material and cheaper laminating process.  It was suspected that adding the 
aluminized Kapton layer might prevent the white powder from reaching the shelter interior.  
Although the adhesive had previously been rejected and it was known that the adhesive would 
have a lower thermal failure point than the polyimide adhesive, it was carried forward as one 
design alternative in the close-out tests.  In all of the above configurations, the aluminized 
Kapton layer used was a 0.05 mm (0.002 inch) thick polyimide film aluminized on one side and 
supplied by Dunmore Corporation (product number DE330). 
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The CHIEFS close-out shelters used two similar versions of laminate for the outer shell. 
The most common version was composed of a 0.122 g/in2 (5.6 oz/yd2) silica fabric with a 0.0254 
mm (.001 inch) thick aluminum fabric bonded to it by Custom Laminating Corporation using the 
same proprietary adhesive that is used on the M2002.  The areal mass of this laminate, known 
as the “single 7” (S7), is 0.164 g/in2 (7.5 oz/yd2), and its thickness is 0.305 mm (0.012 inch).  
There was also an alternate version tested which used the same 0.122 g/in2 (5.6 oz/yd2) silica 
fabric but with a 0.0254 mm (.001 inch) thick anodized 1235 series aluminum fabric bonded to it 
by Maverick Corporation using their proprietary polyimide adhesive.  The areal mass of this 
alternate laminate was approximately 0.198 g/in2 (9 oz/yd2), and its thickness was 0.330 mm 
(0.013 inch); however, the adhesive content varied significantly as the manufacturer worked to 
find a good balance between adhesion and flexibility.  Both layups are reduced mass concepts 
compared to the standard M2002 outer shell, 
0.262 g/in2 (12 oz/yd2), and by removing mass 
from the outer shell fabric, which is likely 
mechanically overbuilt, this mass could be 
used where it would have a more effective 
contribution to thermal performance in the 
form of insulations.  The purpose of testing the 
alternate version, with the polyimide adhesive, 
was that it was suspected that fewer 
flammable decomposition compounds would 
be produced by the polyimide adhesive 
compared with the standard M2002 adhesive; 
therefore, by potentially minimizing the 
injection of hot gasses into the shelter wall 
insulations, material degradation and overall 
heat transfer to the shelter interior may be 
delayed.   
Various insulations were investigated for placement between the outer and inner shelter 
layers during the CHIEFS Gen 1 and Gen 2 efforts.  These insulations are covered in some 
detail in previous work [5, 6].  At the conclusion of the Gen 2 effort, a fiberglass batting 
insulation produced by UPF Corporation was found to meet most of the requirements for fire 
shelter application.  These soft and light weight battings are referred to as Ultracore Aircraft 
Insulation (UAI) and are produced in layers with densities between 5.4 and 10.9 kg/m3 (0.34 to 
0.68 lb/ft3) and areal densities of 0.045 to 0.055 g/in2 (2.1 to 2.5 oz/yd2).  The insulation battings 
have a nominal thickness of 12.7 mm (0.5 inch), but are highly compressible and were shown in 
CHIEFS tests to retain existing thermal performance after being compressed to approximately 
9.5 psi for several days at a time.  Furthermore the fiber is extremely flexible and foldable, and 
is commercially available as insulation used on commercial passenger aircraft.  Mass 
spectrometry and thermogravimetric analysis measurements were conducted on this UAI 
insulation at NASA Langley Research Center up to 1000°C at a rate of 20°C per minute, and 
confirmed the absence of toxic byproducts.  A photograph of a sample of this insulation is 
shown in Figure 9.   As in the CHIEFS Gen 2 designs, graphite intumescent flakes were 
sourced from Asbury Carbons (Asbury, NJ) and, imbedded into the fiberglass batting by UPF 
Corporation.  Furthermore, UPF Corporation succeeded in adding a coarse fiberglass scrim, 
into the insulation.  This scrim was requested by the USFS as a measure aimed at producing a 
more durable insulation better suited to the rigors of use in the field.  The UAI insulation with 
only the graphite used fiberglass batting with a density of 5.4 kg/m3 (0.34 lb/ft3), the insulation 
 
FIGURE 9: UAI FIBERGLASS INSULATION BATTING. 
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with only scrim used fiberglass batting with a density of 10.9 kg/m3 (0.68 lb/ft3), and the 
insulation with both graphite and scrim used fiberglass batting with a density of 5.4 kg/m3 (0.34 
lb/ft3).  A picture of the UAI insulation with imbedded 
graphite intumescent flakes and scrim is shown in 
Figure 10.  
Gen 2 testing conducted at North Carolina State 
University in the summer of 2016 indicated that an 
insulation configuration which uses two layers of UAI 
separated by a thin polymer film, with the outer most 
layer of UAI insulation containing imbedded 
intumescent graphite flakes, exhibited top thermal 
performance relative to other tested options [5].  This 
configuration was carried forward to full scale testing 
at the University of Alberta in September 2016 where 
it was determined that the same layup without the thin 
polymer film separating UAI layers exhibited better 
performance than with the polymer film.  For this 
reason, the internal polymer film layer was dropped, 
and this double layer UAI configuration was carrier 
forward as a baseline.  The CHIEFS close-out shelters 
continued with this baseline, except for the 
modification that a layer of scrim was added to the inner most layer of UAI (without the graphite 
intumescent flakes).  A single layer UAI version was also tested, as a lighter weight alternative; 
in this configuration, the single UAI layer contained both the intumescent graphite flakes and 
scrim.  The CHIEFS close-out layups tested are summarized graphically in Figure 11. 
 
FIGURE 11: GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF CHIEFS CLOSE-OUT SHELTER LAYUPS. 
 
FIGURE 10: UAI FIBERGLASS INSULATION 
WITH EMBEDDED INTUMESCENT GRAPHITE 
FLAKES AND SCRIM. 
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The various layups and their associated areal mass and compressed thickness are listed in 
Table 1.  The thickness reported in the table was obtained using an Ames Guage, which applies 
compression pressure to a 6.45 cm2 (1 in2) round foot, and is commonly used to measure 
thickness in compressible textiles; the pressure applied for these measurements was 2.2 kPa 
(0.313 lbm/in2). 
 
Full Scale Close-Out Shelters 
Full scale close-out fire shelters were tested over two test campaigns:  one in late 
August 2017 and the other in late October 2017.  Several standard M2002 shelters were tested 
on both dates; the M2002 serves as the baseline for comparison of shelter performance.  
Additionally, there were four CHIEFS shelter concepts tested based solely on the four layup 
configurations described in Table 1.  In August, the “Double” and “Double Polyimide Outer” 
concepts were tested; there were three of each configuration tested for a total of six CHIEFS 
shelters in addition to two M2002s.  In October, the “Double”, “Single”, and “Single Silicone” 
concepts were tested; there were two of each configuration tested for a total of six CHIEFS 
shelters in addition to four M2002s.  In total, twelve CHIEFS shelters and six M2002s were 
tested during the fall of 2017.  Unlike several previous CHIEFS tests, including the testing at 
NCSU [5], the majority of the close-out CHIEFS shelters were fabricated exactly the same 
except for the wall layup materials.  The only exception was the full floor which was installed on 
TABLE 1: LAYUPS TESTED IN FULL SCALE CLOSE-OUT SHELTER TESTS 
 
Layup Number Layup Name Areal Mass Compressed Thickness
g/m2 Oz/yd2 cm inch
M2002 498 14.7 0.076 0.030
1 Double 658 19.4 0.831 0.327
2 Double Polyimide Outer 709 20.9 0.833 0.328
3 Single 573 16.9 0.333 0.131
4 Single Silicone 570 16.8 0.259 0.102
TABLE 2: FIVE SECOND GENERATION SCREENING TEST SHELTERS 
 
Layup Name Average Shelter
Mass [lb]
Floor Test 
Date
Shelters 
Tested
M2002 4.3 Full August 2
Double 4.9 Racetrack August 3
Double Polyimide Outer 5.3* Full* August 3
M2002 4.3 Full October 4
Double 4.9 Racetrack October 2
Single 4.6 Racetrack October 2
Single Silicone 4.5 Racetrack October 2
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the “Double Polyimide Outer” shelters by mistake.  This variation would have no effect on the 
data reported in this paper; however, the shelter mass is slightly higher than if a racetrack floor 
would have been used, and consequently a direct comparison to the mass of the “Double” is not 
accurate. All shelters used the standard M2002 geometry, M2002 wall seams, racetrack floor 
(described in more detail in the “Full Scale Shelter Test Setup” section), and M2002 floor band 
seams.  Total shelter mass for each concept tested and the test dates are shown in Table 2.  It 
should be noted that actual production shelters, for the CHIEFS concepts, would be a few 
tenths of a pound heavier than the reported values here because a full sized floor as well as 
deployment handles would be required. 
Full Scale Shelter Test Criterion 
Shelters were tested until either the cooler of the two 2-inch thermocouples exceeded 
150°C or 120 seconds of testing had elapsed (whichever occurred first).  The 120 second cut off 
was the result of a need to limit the duration that the test apparatus was exposed to heating, 
and the 150°C 2-inch thermocouple cut off was selected as the 2-inch thermocouple 
temperature fail point.  Shelter conditions beyond the limits of habitability were not sought.  
Close-out shelter tests were graded by comparing time to failure.  Failure was meant to 
approximate when conditions inside the shelter were expected to no longer be survivable.  Time 
to failure occurred when at least one of six variables exceeded a limit; five of these variables are 
described in Table 3, the sixth variable being the observation of significant heavy smoke 
particles or irritants inside of the shelter post-test or in video data.  The cut off values were 
selected by the USFS and University of Alberta test directors.  The selected values give some 
basis for comparison between shelter candidates.  Rationale for each variable is described in 
more detail in the paragraph below. 
A 1944 study conducted on the injuries sustained by animals inhaling heat is the basis 
for the 2-inch “breathing zone” temperature criterion limit.  In the study, 18 dogs and 2 pigs were 
subjected to direct injections of dry air, steam, and flames at various temperatures.  The animals 
were sedated for the study; all but two animals were killed and autopsy revealed the extent of 
damage.  The author describes a key finding, “A few breaths of air delivered into the pharynx at 
a temperature of 300°C or of steam delivered at 100°C caused such severe local edema within 
a few hours that the animals died of obstructive asphyxia.”  A value of 150°C was selected by 
the test directors as a reasonable maximum survivable limit. 
The 10-inch thermocouple maximum temperature limit was selected based on the 
requirements of NFPA 1977 [14], a standard which dictates performance requirements for 
protective equipment carried by fire fighters.  The National Fire Protections Association (NFPA) 
publishes a variety of standards which regulate the fire protection industry.  NFPA 1977 requires 
TABLE 3: FIVE OF SIX SHELTER TEST FAILURE CRITERION. 
 
 
Variable Failure Criterion Rationale Justification
2-inch Thermocouple > 150 C Breathing Air Temperature [13]
10-inch Thermocouple > 300 C NFPA 1977 Gear Limits [14]
Internal Heat Flux > 2 W/cm2 Radiant 2nd Degree Burns [15, 16]
Carbon Dioxide Level > 1700 parts/million Dangerous @ 10 min. [17]
Oxygen Level < 10% Impaired Judgement [18]
18 
 
that materials used in protective gear commonly carried by wildland fire fighters, such as hard 
hats and backpacks, must pass a 260°C oven exposure test.  A value of 300°C was selected by 
the test directors as a reasonable maximum limit. 
Maximum internal radiant heat flux exposure was estimated using criterion developed by 
Alice Stoll.  Stoll was involved in several studies which sought to measure the radiant heat flux 
exposure required to deliver a 2nd degree burn to bare skin [15, 16].  Stoll criterion are well 
established in the fire protection industry and the gold standard Thermal Protective Performance 
(TPP) metric is based on values generated from Stoll criterion.  Stoll’s work assessed bare skin 
exposed to heat; but, firefighters would be clothed in protective gear in a shelter deployment 
and can tolerate a higher heat flux.  Unpublished research conducted at the University of 
Alberta indicates that, if bare skin is covered by typical firefighter protective garments, a second 
degree burn (according to Stoll criterion) would be realized after approximately 25 to 35 
seconds for an incident exposure of 2 W/cm2 or greater.  The test directors selected this 2 
W/cm2 exposure value as the failure criterion for the incident radiant exposure.  Failing the test 
at 2 W/cm2 means the exposure throughout the test was below this value; however, the Stoll 
criterion must assume a constant, not varying, heat flux exposure level to predict time to burn 
injury.  Consequently, the test directors decided to use the criterion as guidance only, and 
ultimately felt that the 2 W/cm2 limit provided a satisfactory safety margin. 
Acute Exposure Guidelines Levels (AEGLs) are publically available for carbon monoxide 
by the Environmental Protection Agency.  AEGLs for carbon monoxide range from 1 to 3, with 3 
being the most extreme exposure.  Level 3 for carbon monoxide is associated with a lethal level 
of poisoning.  According to AEGL-3, carbon monoxide is lethal in 10 minutes at a concentration 
of 1700 parts/million.  This value was selected for the failure criterion for carbon monoxide by 
the test directors; however, they note that this value may be too lenient due to stricter estimates 
from other published sources. 
The United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Respiratory 
Protection Standards 1910 and 1926 were the basis of the minimum oxygen criterion selected 
for the tests.  Test directors reference the standards indicating that oxygen levels of 10-14% 
results in impaired judgement.  Less than 10% oxygen concentration results in more severe 
reactions.  A value of 10% was selected by the test directors as the minimum oxygen 
concentration of a survivable shelter interior. 
Full Scale Shelter Test Results 
Shelters in the August test performed very well exhibiting by far the best performance of 
all CHIEFS shelters tested to date which had a similar mass to the M2002.  The Double shelter 
reached the 120 second maximum test time without failing any of the six test criterion.  NASA 
tested a Gen 1 CHIEFS shelter concept, “M2002-Heavy” in September of 2015, which had 
similar thermal performance on the 2-inch thermocouple to the Double close-out shelter; 
however, the M2002-Heavy weighed 8 lb (3.6 kg), an increase of 63% compared with the 
Double, and was considerably bulkier.  Furthermore, Gen 1 shelters tested in September 2015 
commonly exhibited significant internal flashing or other combustion, which was true in both 
M2002-Heavy shelters tested.  None of the close-out shelters tested in either the August or the 
October tests exhibited any significant internal combustion.  As a result, the close-out shelters 
are considered the most successful of the CHIEFS shelters tested.   
Shelters were exposed to heating from eight propane burners inside a galvanized sheet 
metal enclosure.  In general heating was similar between the August and the October tests; 
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however, there was a significant range in heat flux exposure between individual shelters 
(approximately +/- 20% from the average at a given time).  The total measured heat flux for all 
shelters tested, segregated by test dates, are shown in Figure 12.  Medtherm gauges were 
placed in two corners of the test bed, external to the fire shelters, and faced inward toward the 
center where the fire shelter was located.  The gauges were not water cooled which may 
introduce error.  Data shown here seems to indicate increasing heat flux during the first half of 
the test, and then a leveling off toward the last half.  It is unclear if or how these trends may be 
effected by either a warming cold side temperature reference in the non-cooled heat flux 
gauges, or an accumulation of high absorptivity carbon (soot) on the sensor faces during the 
test, or the changing thermodynamics of the shelter interior due to heating of the enclosure 
shroud and degradation and heating of the shelter, or changes in the stoichiometry of the 
combusting propane throughout the tests.  Results for close-out shelter tests will be reviewed 
next for both August and October tests by failure criterion variable performance. 
 
FIGURE 12: AVERAGE TOTAL HEAT FLUX OUTSIDE OF SHELTERS RECORDED BY MEDTHERM SENSORS FOR ALL 
TESTS. 
Performance at the 2-inch “breathing zone” thermocouple followed expected trends 
between CHIEFS shelters and is shown in Figure 13.  The data shown is the average of all 
shelters tested within a given design, as well as the average of both 2-inch thermocouple results 
for each individual shelter.  In both test series, CHIEFS shelters significantly outperformed the 
M2002.  Between CHIEFS shelters, the Double shelter offered the best performance (longest 
duration of “habitable” breathing zone temperatures), followed by the lighter and thinner Single 
shelter, and finally followed by the M2002.  The variations tested (Double Polyimide Outer and 
Single Silicone) did not indicate significant performance differences compared with the Double 
and Single standard shelters respectively; however, there is some indication that both variations 
performed slightly worse than their respective baseline designs in both cases.  No Double 
design failed the 2-in thermocouple criterion prior to the 120 second test cut off; however, by 
using linear extrapolation the Double shelters offered approximately a 100% improvement in the 
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duration of habitability compared to the M2002 for this variable.  The Single shelters performed 
about 56% better.  Outdoor testing in Edmonton in October was significantly colder than in 
August, which is evident in the temperatures at the start of heating between tests.  In addition to 
the difference in starting temperature, the difference in the slope of the linear portion of the 
temperature rise in the Double shelters tested in August is lower than in the October test.  
Double shelters in both tests were physically the same, and heat flux was comparable as 
demonstrated above. 
 
FIGURE 13: AVERAGED 2-INCH "BREATHING ZONE" THERMOCOUPLE DATA SUMMARY 
A summary of 10-inch “breathing zone” thermocouple data, as well as the failure 
criterion temperature, is shown in Figure 14.  The data shown is the average of all shelters 
tested within a given design, as well as the average of both 10-inch thermocouple results for 
each individual shelter.  Performance of 10-inch thermocouple data follows very similar trends to 
the 2-inch thermocouple data.  This is expected as all shelters remained relatively intact 
structurally and internal flashing or combustion was negligible in all cases.  If internal 
combustion was significant and varied between shelters, 10-inch thermocouple would be 
expected to reflect these differences between shelter internal heating more dramatically than 
the 2-inch data.  As with the 2-in thermocouple data, no Double design failed the 10-in 
thermocouple criterion prior to the 120 second test cut off.  By using linear extrapolation the 
Double shelters offered approximately a 140% improvement in the duration of habitability 
compared to the M2002 for this variable.  The Single shelters performed about 89% better. 
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FIGURE 14: AVERAGED 10-INCH THERMOCOUPLE DATA SUMMARY 
A summary of internal radiant heat flux data, as well as the failure criterion heat flux, is 
shown in Figure 15.  The data shown is the average of all shelters tested within a given design, 
as well as the average of all six copper disk slug calorimeter results for each individual shelter.  
Internal shelter heat flux data followed the same trends as the internal temperature data, except 
that the Double Shelters tested in October seemed to underperform the Double Polyimide Outer 
shelters tested in August after about 75 seconds.  The cause of this phenomenon is not certain; 
there is no indication in the video data to suggest flames or gas barrier degradation occurring 
simultaneously with the upturn in the internal heat flux data.  It is possible that the Double 
Polyimide Outer shelter layup keeps the gas barrier material cooler longer; however, there were 
no direct measurements of the gas barrier during these tests.  Regardless, no CHIEFS shelter 
failed the internal radiant heat flux criterion prior to the 120 second cut off.  Double designs 
seem likely to fail so far past the conclusion of the testing, that extrapolation would likely be too 
inaccurate to warrant estimating duration of habitability improvement compared with the M2002.  
However, linear extrapolation for the Single shelters indicates approximately a 100% 
improvement in the duration of habitability compared to the M2002 for this variable. 
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FIGURE 15: AVERAGED INTERNAL RADIANT HEAT FLUX DATA SUMMARY 
A summary of carbon monoxide concentration data, as well as the failure criterion 
concentration, is shown in Figure 16.  There is about a 20 second lag between the carbon 
monoxide concentration data and the thermal response data due to the distance between the 
gas analyzer and the test rig.  The data shown is the average of all shelters tested within a 
given design.  Carbon Monoxide was a concern because the standard M2002 adhesive, and 
especially the polyimide adhesive, produce significant amounts of carbon monoxide during 
thermal decomposition.  Consequently, the aluminized Kapton was added to the inverted gas 
barrier configuration primarily to mitigate the direct injection of carbon monoxide and other toxic 
and or combustible gasses into the shelter.  The test failure criterion are designed to 
approximate the time at which a shelter no longer provides a habitable environment; the first 
criterion to fail ultimately fails the shelter.  Every CHIEFS shelter that failed at least one of the 
test criterion prior to the 120 second maximum test duration limit failed first due to carbon 
monoxide.  The only shelter not to fail any of the six criterion prior to the 120 second cut off was 
the Double tested in August; thus, carbon monoxide was the limiting variable in all shelters 
except the Double in that test.  Using linear extrapolation for the Double (August) shelters 
indicates approximately an 82% improvement in the duration of habitability compared to the 
M2002 for this variable. 
Another notable observation is the significant decrease in the advantage of the CHIEFS 
shelters compared to the M2002 relative to the other failure criterion.  For example, time to 
failure on the 2-inch thermocouple data was 57% greater than the M2002 for the worst of the 
CHIEFS performers (Single and Single Silicone); however, for carbon monoxide the same 
CHIEFS shelters were only 50% better than the M2002 tested in October and 9% worse than 
the M2002 tested in August.  This decrease in the advantage of the CHIEFS shelters is possibly 
due to the fact that both CHIEFS shelters and M2002 shelters contain roughly the same amount 
of adhesive.  Any failures in the laminates containing adhesive would produce carbon monoxide 
in all designs.  Although the CHIEFS shelters employ the aluminized Kapton in order to contain 
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gasses generated such as carbon monoxide, there is likely more carbon monoxide produced by 
the polyimide adhesive in the CHIEFS shelters, and the aluminized Kapton is almost always 
somewhat compromised by the end of the test.  The compromised aluminized Kapton would be 
less effective at containing carbon monoxide.  Also, there is reason to believe that, like the 
polyimide adhesive, the aluminized Kapton (also a polyimide) may produce carbon monoxide 
upon thermal decomposition at which point the component intended to contain the gas would 
begin to contribute to the problem.  Finally, internal video data from past testing shows that the 
M2002 has a tendency to quickly ventilate smoke upon failure of the aluminum on the two 
laminates which constitute the M2002 layup.  Once the aluminum has been compromised, only 
ceramic fabrics remain in the shelter walls, which allows the shelter to exchange internal gasses 
readily with the external environment.  Given the external environment contains combustion 
hydrocarbon byproducts, it is likely that all shelters are gaining carbon dioxide and carbon 
monoxide and losing oxygen; however, this effect is probably more pronounced in the M2002 
which may help to equalize the CHIEFS and M2002 carbon monoxide concentrations. 
Also of note, the variation in rates of carbon monoxide ingress are significantly more 
variable and sporadic than the other criterion variables.  This is possibly explained by the 
localized variability in how the aluminized Kapton fails in each individual shelter.  The general 
overall extent of damage, upon post-test inspection, is usually consistent with the overall 
thermal performance of the shelters; however, video feed shows that the particular rates and 
behaviors of these failures during testing varies significantly between tests.  As a result, there is 
large variability in the rates and timing of rate changes in the carbon monoxide concentration 
plot; it is likely that a larger sample pool would result in smoother and more consistent results for 
this variable. 
 
FIGURE 16: AVERAGED INTERNAL CARBON MONOXIDE CONCENTRATION DATA SUMMARY. 
A summary of oxygen concentration data, as well as the failure criterion concentration, is 
shown in Figure 16.  There was about a 20 second lag between the oxygen concentration data 
and the thermal response data due to the distance between the gas analyzer and the test rig.  
24 
 
The data shown is the average of all shelters tested within a given design.  CHIEFS shelters 
exemplified a nearly unchanged oxygen concentration throughout testing until nearly the end of 
heating.  Throughout the 120 second maximum test duration, all CHIEFS shelters remained well 
above the lower limit as defined by the oxygen failure criterion.  The M2002 shelters 
experienced a more substantial drop in oxygen concentration; however, none of these shelters 
failed the oxygen criterion either.  Unlike carbon monoxide, oxygen concentration was more 
likely depleted by venting to the external shelter environment upon failure of gas barrier 
materials, and less likely to be the consequence of shelter decomposition byproducts or 
chemical reactions.  There is some suspicion that carbon monoxide may have reached sufficient 
temperatures to react with oxygen in the shelter to produce carbon dioxide; however, the extent 
of this reaction is unknown.  Internal video data from past testing shows that the M2002 has a 
tendency to quickly vent any smoke upon failure of the aluminum on the two laminates which 
constitute the M2002 layup.  Given the external environment contains combustion hydrocarbon 
byproducts, it is likely that all shelters are gaining carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide and 
losing oxygen; however, this effect is probably more pronounced in the M2002 which may 
explain the more significant dip in oxygen levels in the M2002 relative to all CHIEFS shelters. 
 
FIGURE 17: AVERAGED INTERNAL OXYGEN CONCENTRATION DATA SUMMARY 
The final of the six failure criterions set by the test directors was the observation of 
heavy smoke or particles within the shelters during testing (as evident in internal shelter video 
data) or upon post-test inspection of the shelter.  This criterion was by far the most arbitrary, but 
it sought to identify serious threats to the health of the firefighter that would not be reflected by 
other test instrumentation.  The only shelter tested, including M2002s, which elicited a question 
about the presence of smoke or particles inside the shelter was the Single Silicone.  The 
silicone adhesive used for this laminate has been tested in previous shelter configurations and 
was known to produce a smoky white powder which formed a residue on the instrumentation 
inside of the shelter upon thermal decomposition.  A picture of the internal shelter 
instrumentation covered in this residue after the conclusion of one of the two Single Silicone 
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shelter tests is shown in Figure 18.  It should 
be noted that in this test, unlike some 
previous tests, this white powder was 
produced almost entirely after the shelter had 
already failed the carbon monoxide test 
criterion, and largely during the time between 
the conclusion of heating and when the metal 
enclosure was removed from the test bed.  
For this reason, it can be argued that the 
shelter had already failed when the smoke 
subjectively became a potential threat, and 
therefore this test should not be considered 
evidence for an argument against the use of 
the silicone glue on grounds of smoke and 
white powder. 
Figure 20 reveals the sequence of 
smoke ingress at three points: at the time 
when the shelter failed the test due to 
exceeding carbon monoxide criterion (87 
seconds), at the time when the test was 
concluded and heating stopped (119 seconds), and at the end of available video data which 
should be shortly before the test enclosure was removed and the shelter post-test inspection 
(152 seconds). 
Post-test shelter inspection was also a common method of assessing the relative 
endurance of one shelter design compared with another.  The existing test apparatus was not 
designed to capture the 
dynamic forces in a real 
forest fire which would 
result from heavy and 
gusty wind conditions.  
As shelter material 
decomposes thermally it 
often becomes more 
tenuous and brittle, 
leaving it more 
vulnerable to thermal 
performance 
compromising damage 
which may result from 
wind effects.   
 
FIGURE 18: WHITE POWDER COVERING SHELTER 
INTERIOR INSTRUMENTATION AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF 
A SINGLE SILICONE SHELTER TEST. 
 
FIGURE 19: TYPICAL M2002 INTERIOR POST-TEST CONDITION. 
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FIGURE 20: INTERIOR VIDEO DATA SHOWING SUBJECTIVE SMOKE CONCENTRATION 
INSIDE A SINGLE SILICONE SHELTER AT THREE TIMES: TEST CRITERION FAILURE (87 
SECONDS, TOP), TEST CONCLUSION (119 SECONDS, MIDDLE), AND CONCLUSION OF 
VIDEO DATA (152 SECONDS, BOTTOM). 
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Lacking good controls for this evaluation, no 
quantitative data was collected on post-test shelter 
condition; however, photographs of every test 
specimen and notes were taken which highlight the 
general observations. 
In general, M2002 material conditions are fairly 
consistent post-test.  The outer aluminum foil is always 
either completely missing, or left as a brittle powdery 
char.  The outer silica fabric is often brittle and can be 
torn in certain areas. The inner liner (gas barrier) is 
either completely delaminated, with the aluminum 
having fallen into the shelter in large sections, or with 
the aluminum melted into what looks like a porous 
coating on the fiberglass fabric.  The fiberglass fabric is 
often very brittle with areas missing or easily crumbled 
away.  A photograph of a typical M2002 from the close-
out shelter tests is shown in Figure 19. 
A 
photograph 
of a typical 
post-test Single shelter is shown in Figure 21; a 
closer view of the degraded UAI is shown in Figure 
22.  CHIEFS Single shelters generally remain in 
better material condition post-test than the M2002; 
however, there are still often significant 
degradations.  Damage is typically worse near the 
top center of the shelter.  The outer silica fabric is 
sometimes brittle and can be torn in limited 
locations. 
The UAI 
insulation is 
typically 
heavily embrittled and often easily crumbles to dust.  
Large well developed expanded graphite particles are 
heavily concentrated in the UAI fiberglass remnants.  
The inverted gas barrier fiberglass fabric is brittle in 
areas, and aluminum foil covers the fabric in beads of 
aluminum melt.  Aluminized Kapton is either completely 
intact, or burned away with charred edges remaining.  
The charring typically focuses around seams, but can 
be widespread over the area at the top of the shelter 
interior.  Video data indicates that the Kapton will 
openly burn and easily carry a flame.  It is not clear the 
process in which this combustion takes place because 
it is generally known that polyimide does not burn 
openly.  When comparing the post-test conditions of 
CHIEFS shelters to the M2002, it should be noted that 
the M2002 was tested for a shorter period of time and 
 
FIGURE 21: TYPICAL SINGLE INTERIOR POST-
TEST CONDITION. 
 
FIGURE 22: CLOSE UP OF UAI POST-TEST 
CONDITION IN SINGLE SHELTER. 
 
FIGURE 23: TYPICAL DOUBLE SHELTER 
INTERIOR POST-TEST CONDITION. 
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consequently material conditions would be even worse than the observed for the M2002 if it was 
exposed to heating for the full duration of the CHIEFS shelters it is compared to. 
CHIEFS Double shelters generally remain in the best post-test material condition of all 
shelters.  Damage is typically worse near the top center of the shelter and focuses near the 
seams.  The outer silica fabric is sometimes brittle and can be torn in limited locations. The 
outer UAI insulation is typically heavily embrittled and often easily crumbles to dust.  The inner 
UAI insulation often remains pliable with limited regions of brittle or crumbling fibers.  The 
inverted gas barrier fiberglass fabric can be brittle, but not always, and aluminum foil is either 
intact or covers the fabric in beads of aluminum melt.  Aluminized Kapton is largely intact, but 
some limited charred edges or burned out sections focus mostly around seams at the top of the 
shelter.  A photograph of a typical Double from the close-out shelter tests is shown in Figure 23. 
Small-Scale Convective Test Results 
At the conclusion of full scale close-out shelter testing, a series of small scale convective 
tests were run on the shelter wall materials used in the full scale tests.  The small scale 
convective test is an effective method of measuring the thermal performance of shelter 
materials without the confounding effects of a full shelter.  Furthermore, the full scale shelter test 
environment can be somewhat variable, whereas the small scale convective test rig provides 
relatively even and consistent heating with a well-controlled and calibrated heat source.  By 
testing CHIEFS full scale shelter materials in the small-scale convective test setup, relative 
insulation thermal performance could be assessed between options, which can help to 
understand the amplitude of interfering effects which may have influenced the full scale shelter 
test results.  An explanation of the small-scale convective test rig and test methods is found in 
the Small-Scale Convective Test Setup section above. 
Material layups tested were the same as the full scale shelter tests in August and 
October 2017, except that the M2002 Polyimide Outer was not tested in the small-scale 
convective test.  A description of the material configurations tested can be found in Table 4.  In 
the small-scale tests, three identical samples were prepared for a given material configuration 
prior to the test.  During the test, the pre-test calibration was run to ensure the target 8 +/- .4 
W/cm2 heat flux from the burner, and then the three identical samples were exposed 
sequentially until the coolest gas barrier thermocouple recorded a temperature of 200 °C at 
which point the sample was removed.  After the three identical samples were exposed, a post-
test calibration was conducted to ensure the exposure heat flux was still within the target.  The 
results of these tests are shown in Figure 24.  Note that each line on this chart is an average of 
the three samples tested in each of two test runs.  By not averaging the two runs (total of six 
TABLE 4: SMALL-SCALE CONVECTIVE TEST MATRIX. 
 
Layup Number Layup Name Areal Mass Compressed Thickness
g/m2 Oz/yd2 cm inch
M2002 498 14.7 0.076 0.030
1 Double 658 19.4 0.831 0.327
2 Single 573 16.9 0.333 0.131
3 Single Silicone 570 16.8 0.259 0.102
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samples for each material configuration), some idea of the variation between exposures can be 
observed.  The results of the test did not match the amplitude of differences between each 
candidate exactly; however, the relative performance was in good agreement with full scale 
shelter test data. 
 
FIGURE 24: SMALL SCALE CONVECTIVE TEST RIG RESULTS OF LAYUPS USED ON FULL SCALE CLOSE-OUT 
SHELTERS TESTED. 
Concluding Remarks 
Of all NASA shelters tested during the nearly four year CHIEFS task, the close-out fire 
shelters demonstrated the best performance for their weight.  The Double shelter (August 2017) 
was the only shelter to exceed the maximum 120 second test duration without failing any of the 
six test criterion.  The Double (October 2017) and Double Polyimide Outer also survived all 
other test criterion prior to the 120 second cutoff, except carbon monoxide.  The only other 
CHIEFS design which was able to survive the 120 seconds without failing the 2-inch 
thermocouple test criterion was the M2002-Heavy (Gen 1) shelter tested in 2015; however, the 
M2002-Heavy was an 8 lb shelter (approximately 63% heavier than the Double).  Small-scale 
convective tests were conducted to confirm the observed relative shelter performance, and 
relative results of this better controlled test were consistent with the full scale results. 
The tests were conducted in two periods, August 2017 and October 2017.  Four fire 
shelter concepts were tested and compared by the duration in which each shelter concept was 
able to provide a habitable interior environment relative to other candidates and most 
importantly the current fire shelter, the M2002.  Habitability was defined by the period of time 
that the shelter was undergoing heating without having exceeded a “failure” threshold in any 
one of the six different test criterion.  The six test criterion were 2-inch thermocouple 
temperature, 10-inch thermocouple temperature, internal radiant heat flux, carbon monoxide 
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concentration, oxygen concentration, and a subjective analysis of heavy smoke or airborne 
particles present in the shelter interior. 
Close-out shelter performance owes some of its success to a novel binary gas barrier 
concept.  This concept makes use of an inverted fiberglass-aluminum foil laminate fabricated 
using high temperature polyimide adhesive, and backed by an aluminized Kapton film.  The 
adhesive produces significant amounts of carbon monoxide when it undergoes thermal 
degradation; consequently, the aluminized Kapton film was added to mitigate the ingress of this 
carbon monoxide (and other undesirable gaseous biproducts) to the shelter interior.  
Nonetheless, the first of the six criterion failed by CHIEFS close-out shelters was almost 
unanimously carbon monoxide.   
At the conclusion of the 2017 fiscal year, funding for the CHIEFS task expired and 
sources of continued funding into the 2018 fiscal year were not able to be secured.  
Consequently, the close-out fire shelter tests described in this paper represent the final round of 
fire shelter candidates generated under CHIEFS.  At the time of this writing, a recent National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group Fire Shelter Sub-Committee meeting concluded that the CHIEFS 
Double and Single shelters would be two of the three down-selected candidates carried forward 
to mechanical wear testing during the upcoming 2018 fire season.  During this wear testing, a 
number of shelters for each the Single and Double configurations would be carried by 
firefighters in the field for the duration of the fire season.  After the fire season, these test 
shelters will be inspected for damage due to the wear and tear associated with firefighting.  After 
reviewing these results, a final decision will be made on any potential replacements for the 
current M2002.  The Double shelter is currently being considered for a vehicle carried design; 
the Single shelter is being considered as a direct replacement for the M2002 as a shelter carried 
on the person of the firefighters in the field.  Fire shelters are required by the Forest Service to 
be carried by personnel fighting wildfire.  The fire shelter program is managed by the Forest 
Service at the Missoula Technology Development Center (MTDC) in Missoula, Montana. 
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